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Article
Parochial Versus Universal Cooperation:
Introducing a Novel Economic Game
of Within- and Between-Group Interaction
Hillie Aaldering1 and Robert Bo¨hm2
Abstract
Engaging in personally costly within-group cooperation benefits one’s in-group members but also impacts other groups by bene-
fiting, neglecting, or harming out-group members, leading to a range of potential consequences for between-group relations (e.g.,
collaboration vs. competition). We introduce the Intergroup Parochial and Universal Cooperation (IPUC) game to investigate the
prevalence of the individual preferences underlying these different expressions of within-group cooperation: universalism, weak
parochialism, and strong parochialism. In two online experiments with natural groups, we show that the IPUC has value beyond
existing economic games in measuring these preferences separately. In a third experiment conducted in the lab, we show how
dispositional measures traditionally associated with within- and between-group cooperation, that is, social value orientation, social
dominance orientation, honesty-humility, and empathic concern, predict different preferences. Thus, the IPUC provides a tool to
better understand within- and between-group interactions and to test interventions to overcome intergroup conflict.
Keywords
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To survive and thrive, humans need to cooperate within groups
(Nowak, 2006). Within-group cooperation poses a social
dilemma, where each individual benefits by acting selfishly,
but the joint welfare of all in-group members is maximized
by mutual cooperation (Dawes, 1980). Evolutionary adaption
has selected mechanisms that promote within-group coopera-
tion (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Rand & Nowak, 2013), and psy-
chological research has offered various explanations for its
occurrence, such as reciprocity between in-group members and
shared social identities (Brewer, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986;
Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999).
However, the underlying motivation of within-group coop-
eration can be ambiguous, benefiting, neglecting, or harming
other groups (Bornstein, 2003; Dawes, 1980). Previous
research in psychology and beyond has proposed different indi-
vidual preferences in within- and between-group interaction:
Firstly, individuals might strive to benefit both the in-group and
the out-group equally; universal cooperation (Buchan et al.,
2009). Secondly, they might want to benefit the in-group but
not the out-group; weak parochial cooperation (e.g., neither
actively harming nor actively helping out-group members;
see Aaldering, Ten Velden, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2018;
Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006). Thirdly, individuals
might want to engage in within-group cooperation to actively
harm the out-group; strong parochial cooperation (Bo¨hm,
Rusch, & Gu¨rerk, 2016; Choi & Bowles, 2007). For example,
one may choose to enlist for military service to promote peace
for all countries (universal cooperation), to protect the own
country (weak parochial cooperation), or to harm other coun-
tries (strong parochial cooperation). Notably, all these prefer-
ences are reflected in within-group cooperation because they
are costly for the contributing individuals (e.g., time, effort,
risk of injury) while benefiting their in-group’s welfare. How-
ever, they can lead to diametrically opposed consequences in
intergroup relations, ranging from coalition and peaceful coex-
istence to conflict and violence (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; De
Dreu, Balliet, & Halevy, 2014).
There is much evidence that individuals generally prefer to
cooperate with in-group over out-group members, that is, they
display parochial cooperation (for a meta-analysis, see Balliet,
Wu, & De Dreu, 2014). Parochialism has become a catch-all
term, referring to either an ignorance or an aversion toward
out-groups, reflecting weak versus strong parochialism, respec-
tively (e.g., Bernhard et al., 2006; Choi & Bowles, 2007). Yet
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behavioral measures assessing parochial (vs. universal) cooper-
ation cannot univocally distinguish between universal versus
weak parochial versus strong parochial cooperation (Bo¨hm,
Rusch, et al., 2018). As a consequence, little is known about the
differential psychological processes associated with each of
these preferences.
Here, we introduce the Intergroup Parochial and Universal
Cooperation (IPUC) game and use it in three preregistered and
incentivized online and lab experiments with natural and mini-
mal group identities to (i) behaviorally disentangle these prefer-
ences and (ii) estimate their prevalence. We (iii) demonstrate the
unique value of the IPUC game over other economic games in
separating universal versus weak parochial versus strong paro-
chial cooperation as well as egoism, and (iv) identify interindi-
vidual differences predicting unique behavioral preferences.
Economic Games of Within- and Between-Group
Interaction
Economic games form a prime measurement tool of coopera-
tive behavior (Murnighan & Wang, 2016). However, the pre-
ferences underlying cooperation can only be understood
when there are behavioral options corresponding with specific
individual preferences.
Two games measuring within- and between-group coopera-
tion are the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma-Maximizing Dif-
ferences (IPD-MD; Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008) and
the Nested Social Dilemma (NSD; Wit & Kerr, 2002). The
IPD-MD separates two pools to which a player can choose to
contribute an individual endowment at personal cost: one that
benefits the in-group (within-group pool; resembling weak
parochial cooperation) and one that benefits the in-group while
harming the out-group (between-group pool; resembling strong
parochial cooperation). While this game can capture differ-
ences in the preference for weak parochialism (or in-group
love) and strong parochialism (or out-group hate; see e.g.,
Halevy et al., 2008, 2012; Weisel & Bo¨hm, 2015), it provides
no option for individuals who want to benefit both groups
equally; universal cooperation. Someone with a preference for
universal cooperation may instead contribute to the closest
alternative available, the within-group pool, and/or decide to
contribute less. In the IPD-MD, contributions to the within-
group pool therefore intertwine the preferences for universal
and weak parochial cooperation.
The NSD, in contrast, separates contributions to a local pool
(like the within-group pool of the IPD-MD, resembling weak
parochial cooperation) and contributions to a global pool, ben-
efiting both groups equally (resembling universal cooperation).
However, there is no pool for strong parochial cooperation. The
best alternative to benefit the in-group while harming the out-
group would be to contribute to the local pool. Thus, the prefer-
ence underlying contributions to the local pool in the NSD can
be either weak or strong parochial cooperation.
In sum, neither the IPD-MD nor the NSD can unequivocally
separate weak parochial cooperation from other potentially rele-
vant preferences. This is remarkable given the widespread
debate in the psychological literature and beyond on the nature
of parochial cooperation (Choi & Bowles, 2007; Corr, Har-
greaves Heap, Seger, & Tsutsui, 2015; Rusch, 2014; Rusch,
Bo¨hm, & Herrmann, 2016; Thielmann & Bo¨hm, 2016). We thus
devised the IPUC game to model universal, weak parochial, and
strong parochial cooperation separately (for a game-theoretical
analysis, see Supplemental Material). As in the NSD, contribu-
tions to the first pool benefit both groups equally (universal
cooperation). And as in the IPD-MD and NSD, contributions
to the second pool solely benefit in-group members (weak paro-
chial cooperation). As in the IPD-MD, contributions to the third
pool benefit in-group members, while harming out-group mem-
bers (strong parochial cooperation). Alternatively, individuals
may choose to egoistically keep their endowment and contribute
it to neither of the pools.
The Present Research and Hypotheses
As a first step, we aimed to demonstrate the added value of the
IPUC over the IPD-MD (Experiment 1) and the NSD (Experi-
ment 2). We expected universal and weak parochial cooperation
to be relevant behavioral motivations, each with larger-than-zero
contributions in the IPUC (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, because the
within-group pool in the IPD-MD intertwines universal and
weak parochial cooperation, whereas these preferences are beha-
viorally separated by different pools in the IPUC, we expected
larger contributions to the within-group pool in the IPD-MD
compared with the weak parochial cooperation pool in the IPUC
(Hypothesis 2). Given the equivalence in the preferences under-
lying contributions to the strong parochial pool in both games,
we did not expect contribution differences here (Hypothesis
3). When comparing the IPUCwith the NSD, we expected larger
contributions to the local pool in the NSD (Hypothesis 4), which
resembles weak parochial cooperation but is also the closest
available alternative for strong parochial cooperation, than to the
weak parochial cooperation pool in the IPUC.
As a second step, we aimed to exploit the advantages of the
IPUC by investigating how interindividual differences predict
unique preferences in within- and between-group interaction
(Experiment 3). We propose that the generally prosocial traits
of social value orientation (SVO), empathic concern (EC), and
honesty-humility (H-H) each uniquely correlate with contribu-
tions to the pool reflecting the respective preference.
SVO reflects individuals’ preference for distributing out-
comes between themselves and someone else (Van Lange,
1999). A pro-social value orientation generally predicts coop-
eration (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009); hence, SVO should
be positively associated with universal cooperation and nega-
tively with egoism. However, pro-socials’ cooperation is often-
times confined to their own group (Aaldering, Greer, Van
Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013; De Dreu, 2010), sometimes even at
the expense of another group (Abbink, Brandts, Herrmann, &
Orzen, 2012). Using the IPUC, we test whether pro-socials’
concern is limited to the in-group (weak parochial cooperation)
when universal cooperation is possible as well (Hypotheses 5a–
c; see Table 1).
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H-H is a general inclination to be sincere, fair, and modest
(Lee & Ashton, 2004). It is associated with fairness and con-
cern for others’ welfare, irrespective of group membership
(Gerpott, Balliet, Columbus, Molho, & De Vries, 2017; Thiel-
mann & Bo¨hm, 2016; Zettler, Hilbig, & Heydasch, 2013).
Higher values of H-H should therefore be associated with more
universal cooperation but with less strong parochial coopera-
tion and less egoism (Hypotheses 6a–c).
EC is the proneness to feel compassion and sympathy and a
general understanding of the emotional state of others (Batson
& Shaw, 1991). EC is related to pro-social behavior and
decreased biases against out-groups and associated with helping
of out-groupmembers (Batson et al., 1997;Bo¨hm,Theelen, et al.,
2018). This should be mirrored in more universal cooperation
and less strong parochial cooperation (Hypotheses 7a and 7b).
In contrast with these pro-social traits stands social domi-
nance orientation (SDO), an ideology concerning preferences
for a group-based hierarchy in a society (Pratto, Sidanius, Stall-
worth, & Malle, 1994). High SDO is associated with a compet-
itive and discriminatory mind-set toward out-group members
(Ho et al., 2015; Kteily, Ho, & Sidanius, 2012; Pratto et al.,
2013, Whitley, 1999). Moreover, individuals high in SDO keep
resources withheld from the out-group to themselves rather
than contributing them to help their in-group (Halali, Dorf-
mann, Sun, & Halevy, 2018). This should be reflected in more
strong parochial cooperation and egoism and in less universal
cooperation (Hypotheses 8a–8c).
Experiment 1
To test Hypotheses 1–3, we compared the contributions in the
IPUC and the IPD-MD using a natural group setting, with
group membership being determined by political identification,
consisting of U.S. Democrats versus Republicans.
Method
Participants
U.S. participants were recruited online via Prolific Academic.
An a priori power analysis revealed a required sample size of
128 participants to achieve a power of 1 b¼ .80 for detecting
an effect size of d ¼ 0.5 in a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) to test Hypothesis 2. We originally collected data
of 174 participants. Twenty-eight participants were removed
from the data because they did not identify with either Demo-
crats or Republicans. Furthermore, we preregistered to remove
participants who would fail in more than half of the compre-
hension questions (n ¼ 19). The final sample size was N ¼
127 (51% female, Mage ¼ 28.23, SD ¼ 7.61).1
Procedure
The experimental procedure received institutional review
board (IRB) approval. Participants provided informed consent
and were randomly assigned to play either the IPUC or the
IPD-MD. Their identification with the political group of
Democrats versus Republicans (1 ¼ very much Democrat to
7 very much Republican) was used as covariate in the analy-
ses. Depending on their identification (responses smaller or
larger than the midpoint of the item), participants were
assigned to a four-member group composed of Democrats
or Republicans and received task instructions referring to
their respective group membership. Following extensive
game instructions, participants completed a number of com-
prehension questions and made their contribution decisions.
Each game was played 3 times in a row without feedback
on others’ contributions in between.
In the IPUC (IPD-MD), participants could choose how to
contribute an endowment of 10 monetary units (MUs; 1 MU
¼ £0.5) among three (two) pools in three consecutive rounds.
The behavioral options (and the preferences they capture) as
well as the respective payoff consequences are shown in Table
2. Pools were labeled neutrally, that is, Pool A, Pool B, and so
on. The mean contribution over three rounds constituted our
dependent variable with Cronbach’s a between .92 and .98 for
all contribution options in both games.
Table 1. Preregistered Hypotheses for Associations Between Inter-
individual Differences and Preferences in the Intergroup Parochial and
Universal Cooperation (Experiment 3).
Interindividual
Differences
Universal
Cooperation
Weak
Parochial
Cooperation
Strong
Parochial
Cooperation Egoism
Hypothesis 5: SVO þa þb NP c
Hypothesis 6: H-H þa NP b c
Hypothesis 7: EC þa NP b NP
Hypothesis 8: SDO a NP þb þc
Note. A plus sign refers to a predicted positive relationship, a minus sign refers
to a predicted negative relationship. Superscripts refer to subhypotheses. SVO
¼ social value orientation; H-H ¼ honesty-humility; SDO ¼ social dominance
orientation; EC ¼ empathic concern; NP ¼ no prediction.
Table 2. Return Per Contributed Monetary Unit for the Contributor,
Each In-Group Member, and Each Out-Group Member, Depending on
the Behavioral Option in Each Game.
Game
Preference
Universal
Cooperation
Weak
Parochial
Cooperation
Strong
Parochial
Cooperation Egoism
IPD-MD 0.5, 0.5, 0 0.5, 0.5, 0.25 1, 0, 0
NSD 0.4, 0.4, 0.4 0.5, 0.5, 0 1, 0, 0
IPUC 0.4, 0.4, 0.4 0.5, 0.5, 0 0.5, 0.5, 0.25 1, 0, 0
Note. In the IPD-MD, the first option (from left to right) is often labeled the
within-group pool (conflating universal and weak parochial cooperation) and
the second option is often labeled the between-group pool (resembling strong
parochial cooperation), see Halevy, Bornstein, and Sagiv (2008). In the NSD,
the first option is often labeled the global pool (resembling universal coopera-
tion) and the second option is often labeled the local pool (conflating weak and
strong parochial cooperation), see Buchan et al. (2009). IPD-MD ¼ Intergroup
Prisoner’s Dilemma-Maximizing Differences; IPUC ¼ Intergroup Parochial and
Universal Cooperation game; NSD ¼ Nested Social Dilemma.
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Upon completion, participants were paid £0.85. Addition-
ally, one out of eight participants received a bonus payment
based on the own and other participants’ contributions in one
randomly chosen round (up to £26.30). Bonus payments were
determined after completion of the study by randomly selecting
one eighth of participants and matching four Democrats and
four Republicans to groups.
Results
Distribution of contributions to each preference in each game
as well as means and confidence intervals (CIs) are shown in
Figure 1.2 Supporting preregistered Hypothesis 1, participants
playing the IPUC contributed significantly more than zero to
the universal cooperation pool, t(61) ¼ 6.74, p < .001, Cohen’s
d ¼ 0.86, 95% CI [2.30, 4.25], as well as to the weak parochial
cooperation pool, t(61) ¼ 6.79, p < .001, Cohen’s d ¼ 0.86,
95% CI [1.71, 3.31]. While not explicitly hypothesized, we also
obtained significantly larger-than-zero contributions to the
strong parochial cooperation pool, t(61) ¼ 3.92, p < .001,
Cohen’s d ¼ 0.50, 95% CI [0.60, 1.83], as well as to the ego-
istic option, t(61) ¼ 6.89, p < .001, Cohen’s d ¼ 0.87, 95%
CI [2.09, 3.81].
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with political identi-
fication as covariate supported preregistered Hypothesis 2,
showing larger contributions to the within-group pool in the
IPD-MD (intertwining universal and weak parochial coopera-
tion) than to the weak parochial cooperation pool in the IPUC,
F(1, 124) ¼ 7.37, p ¼ .008, Z2p ¼ .06, 95% CI [0.41, 2.84].
There was also an effect of political identification, F(1, 124)
¼ 4.06, p ¼ .046, Z2p ¼ .032, 95% CI [0.61, 0.01], indicat-
ing larger contributions to either pool the more participants
identified as Democrats. Finally, in line with preregistered
Hypothesis 3, an ANCOVA showed no difference between the
games in contributions capturing strong parochial cooperation
(i.e., the between-group pool in the IPD-MD and the strong
parochial cooperation pool in the IPUC, respectively), F(1,
124) ¼ 2.05, p ¼ .155, Z2p ¼ .02, 95% CI [0.27, 1.67]. There
was no effect of political identification, F(1, 124) ¼ 2.14, p ¼
.146, Z2p ¼ .02, 95% CI [0.43, 0.02].3
Because null effects cannot be interpreted as supportive of a
null hypothesis (Hypothesis 3), we tested whether the level of
strong parochial cooperation in the IPD-MD versus IPUC was
indeed statistically equivalent using the two-one-sided-t-test
(TOST) procedure (Lakens, 2017). We determined the equiva-
lence bounds based on a small effect size, d ¼ 0.02. The
equivalence test of two one-sample t tests was not significant,
tlower quivalence bound(121.37) ¼ 2.50, p < .001, and tupper equiva-
lence bound (121.37) ¼ 0.24, p ¼ .595. We can therefore not
reject the hypothesis that there exists a true effect of a small
Figure 1. Contributions indicating different preferences in the Intergroup Parochial and Universal Cooperation (n ¼ 62) and in the Intergroup
Prisoner’s Dilemma Maximizing Differences (IPD-MD; n ¼ 65; Experiment 1) games. Points represent mean values, error bars represent
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (1,000 iterations). White and gray areas represent rotated kernel density distributions. In the IPD-MD,
universal and weak parochial cooperation are intertwined by contributions to the within-group pool and strong parochial cooperation is
captured by contributions to the between-group pool.
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size in the difference in strong parochial cooperation between
the IPD-MD and the IPUC.
Discussion and Introduction to Experiment 2
Results of Experiment 1 demonstrate the prevalence of each
behavioral motivation as well as the added value of the IPUC
over the IPD-MD in disentangling universal and weak paro-
chial cooperation. Experiment 2 was designed to compare the
IPUC to the NSD, testing Hypotheses 1 and 4.
Method
Participants
U.S. participants were recruited online via Prolific Academic.
An a priori power analysis revealed a required sample size of
178 participants to achieve a power of .80 for detecting an
effect size of d ¼ 0.42 for Hypothesis 4 (determined based
on the effect size obtained in Experiment 1 for the structurally
equivalent Hypothesis 2) in a one-way ANOVA. Nine of our
original 226 participants were removed from the analyses
because they did not identify with either Democrats or Repub-
licans. In accordance with a priori specifications, 37 partici-
pants were removed from the analyses because of our
preregistered exclusion criteria (they failed more than half of
the comprehension questions), leading to a final sample of
N ¼ 180 (41% female, Mage ¼ 30.33, SD ¼ 7.22).
Procedure
The experimental procedure received IRB approval. The proce-
dure was the same as in Experiment 1, with the exception that
half of the participants played the NSD (and not the IPD-MD,
as in Experiment 1). The behavioral options and respective
payoff consequences are shown in Table 2; the instructions and
comprehension questions were adapted accordingly. Cron-
bach’s a ranged between .93 and .97 over the three contribution
rounds for all behavioral options in both games.
Results
Distribution of contributions to each preference in each game
as well as means and confidence intervals are shown in Figure
2. Contributions to each of the pools in the IPUC differed from
zero, supporting preregistered Hypothesis 1: t(93) ¼ 9.09, p <
.001, Cohen’s d ¼ 0.94, 95% CI [2.22, 3.46], for contributions
to the universal cooperation pool; t(93) ¼ 10.93, p < .001,
Cohen’s d ¼ 1.13, 95% CI [2.60, 3.75], for contributions to the
weak parochial cooperation pool; and t(93) ¼ 5.77, p < .001,
Cohen’s d ¼ 0.59, 95% CI [0.93, 1.90], for contributions to the
strong parochial cooperation pool. Egoism was a significant
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Universal
cooperation
Weak parochial
cooperation
Weak/Strong parochial
cooperation
Strong parochial
cooperation
Egoism
Preference
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
IPUC NSD
Figure 2. Contributions indicating different preferences in the Intergroup Parochial and Universal Cooperation game (n ¼ 94) and in the
Nested Social Dilemma (NSD; n ¼ 86; Experiment 2). Points represent mean values, error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals (1,000 iterations). White and gray areas represent rotated kernel density distributions. In the NSD, weak and strong parochial
cooperation are intertwined by contributions to the local pool and universal cooperation is captured by contributions to the global pool.
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preference too, t(93) ¼ 8.71, p < .001, Cohen’s d ¼ 0.90, 95%
CI [1.98, 3.15].
An ANCOVA with political identification as covariate
showed larger contributions to the local pool in the NSD (inter-
twining weak and strong parochial cooperation) than to the
weak parochial cooperation pool in the IPUC, F(1, 177) ¼
4.12, p¼ .044, Z2p ¼ .023, 95% CI [0.02, 1.63], supporting pre-
registered Hypothesis 4. There was a marginally significant
effect of political identification, F(1, 177) ¼ 3.26, p ¼ .073,
Z2p ¼ .032, 95% CI [0.41, 0.02], indicating smaller contribu-
tions to these pools the more participants identified as
Democrats.
Discussion and Introduction to Experiment 3
Experiment 2 replicated the relevance of the behavioral prefer-
ences and supported the additional value of the IPUC over the
NSD in separating weak and strong parochial cooperation.
Experiment 3 was designed to elucidate which individuals
would be more likely to adopt each of the preferences—mea-
sured in the IPUC—by testing their unique association with
interindividual differences in SVO, H-H, SDO, and EC (see
Table 1).
Method
Participants
This study was conducted with undergraduate students at a
Western-European university in the laboratory using minimal
groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). An a priori power analysis
revealed a required sample size of 173 participants to achieve
a power of .80 for detecting a small- to medium-sized correla-
tion of r¼ .21 (based on the mean correlation in social and per-
sonality psychology; see Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota,
2003). After excluding 12 of the 192 participants based on our
preregistered criteria of having scored two or more standard
deviations above the mean error rate in the comprehension
questions, N ¼ 180 participants remained in the sample (45%
female, Mage ¼ 24.54, SD ¼ 4.46).4
Materials
SVO was measured with the 6 primary items of the SVO slider
measure (Murphy, Ackerman, & Handgraaf, 2011). Partici-
pants were asked to decide about the distribution of MUs
(100 MUs ¼ €1) between themselves (sender) and an anon-
ymous other (receiver). In each choice, they were presented
with nine options, with varying outcomes for themselves and
the other person (between 15 and 100 MUs). Based on their
responses, the SVO angle was computed, with higher scores
referring to a more prosocial orientation, reflecting greater con-
cern for equality and/or social welfare. All players completed
the measure in the role of the sender. At the end of the experi-
ment, the role of sender and receiver was determined randomly,
one sender was matched to one receiver, and participants
received their payments for 1 randomly selected item.
H-H was measured with a translated version of the 60-item
HEXACO personality inventory (Ashton & Lee, 2007; transla-
tion: Moshagen, Hilbig, & Zettler, 2014) using a 5-point
Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly
agree (10-item H-H subscale with Cronbach’s a ¼ .80). To
ensure the validity of the measurement, all subscales of the
HEXACO were administered (not analyzed further).
SDO was measured with a translated adaption of the scale
developed by Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle (1994;
translation: Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009). The 12 items used a 7-
point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree to
strongly agree (Cronbach’s a ¼ .88).
Lastly, EC was measured with a translated adaptation of
the interpersonal reactivity index (Davis, 1983; translation:
Paulus, 2009). The 16 items used a 7-point Likert-type scale
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree (Cronbach’s
a ¼ .75; excluding the subscale Personal Distress following
Paulus, 2009).
Procedure
The experimental procedure received IRB approval. Partici-
pants took part in experimental sessions of 24 participants each
and were randomly seated in separated computer cubicles.
Instructions were provided via the computer screen. The order
of task completion was counterbalanced between experimental
sessions: Half of the participants started with the SVOmeasure,
followed by questionnaires assessing HEXACO, SDO, and EC
(in this order), and ended with the IPUC. The other half started
with the IPUC, followed by the questionnaire, and ended with
the SVO measure.5
Before participants made their decisions in the IPUC, they
performed an estimation task to form minimal groups (Bo¨hm,
Rothermund, & Kirchkamp, 2013). Here, participants completed
five trials estimating the varying number of objects shown for
about half a second on the screen. Based on the median estima-
tion in the respective session, they were then assigned either to
the “overestimators” group or “underestimators” group.6 Four
members of each group were matched to each other. After this
group composition task, all participants answered questions
regarding their group identification (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears,
1995).
The IPUC was described as in Experiments 1 and 2 with the
exception that the own group was described as over- or under-
estimator group, and the out-group vice versa. Each participant
received an endowment of 10 MUs (1 MU ¼ €0.5) and could
decide how to allocate the tokens to the four behavioral
options. After answering six comprehension questions, partici-
pants made their contribution decision once (rather than 3 times
as in the earlier experiments).
Participants received €1 flat fee payment for completing the
questionnaire. The decisions in the SVO slider measure and
IPUC were paid decision contingently. On average, partici-
pants received €10.50 (between €5 and €17) for the 60-min
experiment.
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Results
Table 3 displays means and standard deviations of all predictor
and outcome variables as well as their zero-order correlations.
We ran a multivariate analysis of variance, with SVO, H-H,
SDO, and EC as predictor variables of contributions to each
of the IPUC pools. All multivariate effects were followed-up
with one-way ANOVAs including all predictors to test the pre-
specified hypotheses.
For SVO, there was a multivariate effect on contributions,
F(3, 173) ¼ 3.61, p ¼ .014, Z2p ¼ .06. Supporting Hypotheses
5a and 5c (see Table 1), a greater pro-social orientation posi-
tively predicted universal cooperation, F(3, 176) ¼ 7.33, p ¼
.007, Z2p ¼ .04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.08], and negatively predicted
egoism, F(1, 175) ¼ 7.23, p ¼ .008, Z2p ¼ .04, 95% CI [0.09,
0.01]. Contrary to Hypothesis 5b, SVO did not predict weak
parochial cooperation, F(1, 175) ¼ 1.02, p ¼ .315, Z2p ¼ .01,
95% CI [0.02, 0.05].
While there was no multivariate effect on contributions for
H-H, F(3, 173)¼ 1.58, p¼ .196, Z2p ¼ .03, H-H was positively
associated with universal cooperation, F(1, 175) ¼ 3.37, p ¼
.068, Z2p ¼ .02, 95% CI [-0.05, 1.27], and negatively associated
with egoism, F(1, 175) ¼ 3.38, p ¼ .068, Z2p ¼ .02, 95% CI
[1.48, 0.05]. These effects were small but in the direction
of Hypotheses 6a and 6c. H-H did not negatively predict strong
parochial cooperation, F(1, 175) < 1, p ¼ .488, Z2p < .01, 95%
CI [0.25, 0.51], rejecting Hypothesis 6b.
The multivariate effect of EC on contributions was signifi-
cant, F(3, 173) ¼ 2.93, p ¼ .035, Z2p ¼ .05. Interestingly, there
was a negative, rather than the expected positive, relation
between EC and universal cooperation, F(3, 176) ¼ 3.85,
p¼ .051, Z2p ¼ .02, 95% CI [2.43, 0.01], rejecting Hypothesis
7a. Additionally, EC positively predicted weak parochial coop-
eration, F(3, 176) ¼ 7.28, p ¼ .008, Z2p ¼ .04, 95% CI [0.41,
2.65]. Rejecting Hypothesis 7b, EC did not predict strong paro-
chial cooperation, F(3, 176) < 1, p ¼ .683, Z2p ¼ .001, 95% CI
[0.56, 0.85].
Finally, despite the lack of a multivariate effect of SDO on
contributions, F(3, 173) ¼ 2.09, p ¼ .103, Z2p ¼ .04, higher
levels of SDO were negatively associated with universal
cooperation, F(1, 175) ¼ 4.23, p ¼ .041, Z2p ¼ .02, 95% CI
[0.94, 0.02], supporting Hypothesis 8a. Moreover, there
was a trend suggesting higher levels of SDO to be predictive
of strong parochial cooperation, F(1, 175) ¼ 3.19, p ¼ .076,
Z2p ¼ .02, 95% CI [0.03, 0.51], in line with Hypothesis 8b.
However, we found no association with egoism, F(3, 176) <
1, p ¼ .509, Z2p ¼ .002, 95% CI [0.36, 0.72], rejecting
Hypothesis 8c.
Discussion
Results of Experiment 3 show how interindividual differences
differentially predict the preference to benefit versus neglect
versus harm the out-group in the IPUC. While some of the
hypotheses were supported, unexpectedly, EC predicted weak
parochial rather than universal cooperation. This supports
recent findings on “parochial empathy” (Bruneau, Cikara, &
Saxe, 2017). Moreover, in contrast with earlier studies (De
Dreu, 2010; Aaldering et al., 2018), SVO did not predict weak
parochial cooperation. This suggests that behaviors and inter-
pretation thereof in within- and between-group interaction can
differ substantially depending on the experimental paradigm
used, further supporting the value of the IPUC.
General Discussion
Understanding individual cooperation in within- and between-
group interaction is crucial in psychological science and
beyond (Balliet et al., 2014; Brewer, 1999; Choi & Bowles,
2007; De Dreu et al., 2014). We introduce the novel IPUC
game to distinguish behavioral preferences underlying
within-group cooperation with different consequences for
out-groups. The IPUC is the first game to isolate weak paro-
chial cooperation from other preferences. Weak parochial
cooperation is intertwined either with universal cooperation
or with strong parochial cooperation in the IPD-MD and the
NSD, respectively.7 Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate the rele-
vance of universal, weak parochial, and strong parochial coop-
eration as well as egoism and suggest how these preferences
can potentially determine the course of between-group rela-
tions: from competition (strong parochial cooperation; Bo¨hm
et al., 2016) to coalition (universal cooperation; Buchan
et al., 2009).
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations With (Bootstrapped Bias Accelerated 95% Confidence Intervals, 1,000 Resamples)
Between Preferences Measured in the Intergroup Parochial and Universal Cooperation Game and Interindividual Differences (Experiment 3).
Preference
Interindividual Difference Measure
SVO H-H SDO EC
M (SD) 27.76 (13.28) 4.56 (0.71) 2.76 (1.06) 2.70 (0.38)
Strong parochial cooperation 0.87 (1.67) .07 [.26, .12] .003 [.12, .11] .12y [.05, .31] .01 [.13, .11]
Weak parochial cooperation 2.59 (2.71) .07 [.06, .20] .03 [.15, .23] .06 [.19, .08] .20* [.03, .39]
Universal cooperation 2.36 (3.05) .22* [.09, .34] .20* [.04, .34] .18* [.31, .03] .06 [.25, .04]
Egoism 4.18 (3.48) .22* [.38, .07] .20* [.35, .05] .14y [.01, .29] .10 [.25, .04]
Note. Boldface values indicate means and standard deviations (in brackets). SVO ¼ social value orientation; H-H ¼ honesty-humility; SDO ¼ social dominance
orientation; EC ¼ empathic concern.
yp < .10. *p < .05.
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Experiment 3 shows that these different preferences may
follow from interindividual differences: A preference for hier-
archies can fuel hostilities between groups by instigating strong
parochial cooperation, while EC limits cooperation to the in-
group. Conversely, a general concern for equality and social wel-
fare facilitates between-group (universal) cooperation. We are
looking forward to future research replicating and extending
these findings, for instance by investigating preferences depend-
ing on other variables, such as relative deprivation (Halevy,
Chou, Cohen, & Bornstein, 2010) and right-wing authoritarian-
ism (Altemeyer, 1998).
A potential methodological criticism regarding Experiments
1 and 2 could address the comparison of games with different
numbers of behavioral options, which could invite demand
characteristics (e.g., Bardsley, 2008). We do not believe that
such effects undermine our interpretations because we found
no significant differences in contributions between games
when the options capture the same preference (e.g., strong
parochial cooperation in the IPD-MD vs. IPUC, universal
cooperation in the NSD vs. IPUC). Nevertheless, future
research using the IPUC could relate measures of interindivi-
dual differences to contributions in different games among the
same participants (within subjects). This would provide a
strong test of the idea that individuals change their contribution
behavior between games depending on their motivational and
personality differences but not based on the mere salience of
certain options. Relatedly, future research should identify cir-
cumstances that facilitate shifts in behavioral preferences, for
example from parochial to universal cooperation. Such
research can be helpful in solving national or global coopera-
tion challenges (Buchan et al., 2009).
In sum, by introducing the IPUC, we allow future research
to move beyond adjusting structural options within the game
to steer behavior, and instead to focus on psychological fac-
tors that impact behavioral preferences, and to refine psycho-
logical theories of within- and between-group interaction
accordingly.
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Notes
1. Results do not change qualitatively when all participants are
retained in the data set in either Experiment 1 or Experiment 2.
2. For correlations between contributions to different pools as well
as shares of different “contribution types” with a pure, partial,
or zero preference in Experiments 1–3, see Supplemental
Material.
3. Results do not change qualitatively when we do not control for
political identification in either Experiment 1 or Experiment 2.
4. Results become somewhat stronger when all participants are
retained in the data set: The effect of H-H on egoism becomes sig-
nificant, F(1, 187)¼ 4.62, p¼ .033, Z2p ¼ .02, 95% CI [1.55,0.
07], as well as the multivariate effect of SDO, F(3, 185) ¼ 2.88,
p ¼ .037, Z2p ¼ .05, particularly because of higher levels of
SDO being associated with strong parochial cooperation, F(1,
187) ¼ 5.22, p ¼ .023, Z2p ¼ .03, 95% CI [0.04, 0.57].
5. Including the order as a covariate did not affect the results in
any way.
6. An analysis of variance showed no effect of participants’ group
membership on group identification, F(1, 178) ¼ 2.41, p ¼ .123,
Z2p ¼ .01.
7. Supporting the importance of this feature, we found that contribu-
tions increased when different preferences map to different beha-
vioral options, indicated by larger combined contributions to the
universal and weak parochial cooperation pools in the IPUC
(M ¼ 5.83, SD ¼ 3.65) than to the respective within-group pool in
the IPD-MD (M ¼ 4.24, SD ¼ 3.86), F(1, 124) ¼ 6.15, p ¼ .014,
Z2p ¼ .047, 95% CI [4.38, 5.69]. It is likely that universal cooperators
rather withheld contributions in the absence of a behavioral option
mapping their preference appropriately.
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